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Moving Beyond
Crisis Management
After nearly a century of ad hoc drought management, the United States needs
a new paradigm centered on risk management.
BY DONALD A. WILHITE

T

o the casual observer, it may appear that in the past
five years, drought has been a more common visitor
to the American landscape. Drought conditions ravaged the southwestern and south-central states during 1995 and 1996, raising havoc in many economic
sectors. It also caused serious environmental and social hardships. Drought has persisted in each year
since, affecting most areas in the country on at least one occasion and
several regions for three or more consecutive years.
From the policy perspective, the most significant droughts may have
been the episode of 1995 and 1996, which sparked a series of initiatives, and the 1999 drought, which struck the eastern United States.
Extending from New England
through most of the Southeast,
this last drought persisted for
nearly 12 months from mid-1998
through late summer 1999, and
garnered considerable attention
because of its wide-ranging and
complex impacts on agriculture,
forestry, water supply, and tourism and recreation.
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Although drought conditions
are common in the eastern United
States, the intensity, duration, and
spatial extent of this event caused
great concern. This drought captured the attention of the major
news media in the drought-affected
area, and they questioned whether
this region and the nation were adequately prepared for extreme
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drought. This drought also coincided with the formation of the
National Drought Policy Commission, a partnership between federal agencies and nonfederal representatives from tribal, municipal, and other interest groups. The
Congress and the president
charged the commission with determining a new direction for
drought management in the
United States–one emphasizing
risk management over crisis management.
Too Little, Too Late

D

rought is normal in virtually all portions of
the United States. It is
a recurring, inevitable
feature of climate. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) estimates average annual

losses because of drought in the
United States to be $6 billion to
$8 billion, more than for any other
natural hazard. 1 Yet the United
States, as well as most other nations, is ill-prepared to deal with
the consequences of drought.
Historically, our nation’s approach to drought management
has been to offer relief to the
affected area. These emergency response programs are for the most
part too little, too late. More importantly, drought relief does little
if anything to reduce the vulnerability of the affected area to future
drought events. On the contrary,
considerable evidence suggests that
government relief actually increases
vulnerability to future events by increasing the recipients’ dependence
on government and by encouraging
resource managers to maintain the
very strategies that place industry,
utilities, the community, and individuals at risk. Improving drought
management will require a new paradigm, one that encourages preparedness and mitigation by applying the
principles of risk management.
The lack of progress in drought
preparedness is often blamed on
constraints that are fallacious, no
longer exist, or represent only a
minor deterrent to improved
drought management. 2 The argument goes that drought is unpredictable; that it is hard to monitor because it develops slowly; that
data on climate and water supply
are inadequate; that information
delivery systems are inadequate;
that a lack of coordination exists
between and within government
agencies responsible for monitoring drought, managing water supply, and planning for and responding to drought; and that suitable
planning methodologies are unavailable. Drought planning sys-

tematically addresses these constraints, whether perceived or real.
Scientists and professional organizations have issued numerous
calls for action to develop a national drought policy, but these
have produced little in the way of
progress. Yet, thanks to the National Drought Policy Act of 19983
and the subsequent report issued
by the National Drought Policy

agers—need a better understanding of the phenomenon before trying to establish plans that reduce
vulnerability for future generations. 5
Drought is different from other
natural hazards such as floods,
earthquakes, and tornadoes, which
occur swiftly and with clearly
visible results. All droughts originate from a significant reduction in

Drought is the Rodney Dangerfield of natural
hazards; it doesn’t get the respect that other
natural hazards do.
Commission to Congress and the
president, we now can develop a
coherent national policy that emphasizes drought preparedness and
mitigation. 4 We are at a critical
crossroads for drought policy. Will
we continue down the road of crisis management or move toward
risk management?
Profiles of Drought

D

rought may be one of
the most complex and
least understood of all
natural hazards, affecting more people than any other
hazard. It is a normal feature of
climate and its recurrence is inevitable. Confusion about its characteristics, however, has meant that
effective management in most parts
of the world has received short
shrift. Drought, in fact, is the
Rodney Dangerfield of natural
hazards; that is, it doesn’t get the
respect that other natural hazards
do, given the magnitude of its
impacts. Scientists, policymakers,
and decision makers—including
farmers and natural resource man-

precipitation extended over a season
or longer. Humans can exacerbate
drought, however, by over-allocating water supplies so demand may
greatly exceed supply in water-short
years. Poor land management practices such as overgrazing can also degrade the productivity of the natural landscape, thus increasing vulnerability to drought.
Many definitions of drought exist, reflecting the different climatic
characteristics between regions and
the wide range of impacts that can
occur on various economic sectors
and the environment.
Droughts are commonly classified as meteorological, agricultural,
and hydrological. Meteorological
drought occurs when there is a significant deficiency of precipitation
compared with what is normal or
expected over some extended period of time. Agricultural drought
results when deficiencies in precipitation lead to a reduction in
soil moisture that retards plant
growth and development and, ultimately, yield. Hydrological
drought, on the other hand, oc-
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curs when an extended precipitation shortfall affects surface and
subsurface water supply, which is
measured by monitoring stream
flow, reservoir and lake levels, and
groundwater.
Hydrological droughts are usually out of phase with meteorological and agricultural droughts since
a time lapse occurs between deficiencies in precipitation and the

periods of water shortage because
of large investments in water storage and transmission facilities. Precisely because the eastern states
have fewer droughts, the region is
generally less prepared to mitigate
and respond to its effects.
Drought differs from other
natural hazards in several critical
ways, which complicates monitoring, impact assessment, mitiga-

Drought, like other natural hazards, has both a
natural and a social component, and human activity
can either mitigate or worsen the physical effects.
lowering of reservoirs or groundwater. In addition, water in hydrological storage systems such as reservoirs and rivers is often used for
multiple and competing purposes
such as drinking water, power generation, flood control, irrigation,
and recreation. Competition for
water in these storage systems escalates during drought, increasing
conflicts among water users.
No wonder there’s a lack of
progress in drought management.
If scientists can’t agree on what
drought is, or how severe it is, how
can policymakers know when to
act? A meteorologist, agronomist,
and hydrologist may well provide three distinctly different responses to the question, are we in
a drought? More important, they
may all be correct.
Droughts occur more frequently
in the West and usually last longer
there, but the droughts of 1998
through 2000 have demonstrated
the vulnerability of eastern states
to severe and extended periods of
low rainfall. Yet the West is currently better equipped to manage
water supplies during extended
22
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tion, and response. First, drought
is a slow-onset, creeping, natural
hazard, so it’s hard to determine
when it begins and ends. Its effects often accumulate slowly over
a considerable period of time and
may linger for years after the event
is over. Scientists and policymakers
continue to debate the criteria for
declaring an end to a drought.
Second, the absence of a precise
and universally accepted definition
of drought adds to the confusion
about whether or not a drought
exists and, if it does, its degree of
severity. Realistically, definitions
of drought must be specific to regions and impacts.
Third, drought does not affect
buildings, roads, and other structures, and it is more geographically
widespread than other natural hazards.
These peculiar characteristics of
drought make quantifying its impacts and providing disaster relief
far more difficult than for other
natural hazards. The National
Drought Mitigation Center, however, recently determined that for
the 48 contiguous states, severe
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and extreme drought affected more
than 25 percent of the country in
27 of the past 100 years. During
the drought of 1934, more than
60 percent of the 48 contiguous
states experienced severe or extreme
drought conditions.
Human Component

M

any people consider
drought to be largely
a natural or physical event. In reality,
drought, like other natural hazards, has both a natural and a social component, and human activity can either mitigate or worsen
the physical effects. Of course, we
can’t change the weather, or meteorological drought, which occurs through persistent large-scale
disruptions in the global circulation pattern of the atmosphere.
But we can change some of the
social factors that determine our
vulnerability to drought.
Our population is not only increasing but also shifting from
humid to more arid climates—
such as from the Northeast and
Midwest to the Sunbelt and the
western states—and from rural to
urban settings. Urban growth
strains limited water supplies and
water supply systems, especially
during periods of peak demand.
An increasingly urbanized population is also increasing conflict
between agricultural and urban
water users, a trend that will only
be exacerbated in the future.
As the population increases, so
does pressure on natural resources.
To improve drought management,
we need to use natural resources
in a more sustainable manner. This
will require a partnership between
individuals and government. Further complicating the picture, in
the future the effects of drought
will fall harder on some economic

sectors, population groups, and regions. Greater awareness of our
environment and the need to preserve and restore environmental
quality is placing greater pressure
on all of us to be better stewards
of natural and biological resources.
One thing is certain: continuing to address the effects of
drought in a reactive, crisis-management mode will do little to reduce the impacts of these events
in the future. In fact, this approach
has been shown to increase vulnerability to drought in the long term
because it increases dependence on
government, which, in turn, decreases self-reliance. If the government continues to bail out the
people most affected by drought,
they will have no incentive to
adopt methods to protect the natural resource base.
In arid and semi-arid Australia,
the best land managers have
learned that foresight and planning can lessen the devastating effects of inevitable long dry spells.
By applying appropriate farm
management practices, farmers can
reduce many of the risks associated
with drought, thus minimizing
their losses. 6 Drought relief in
Australia is now provided only
during exceptional drought conditions. In the United States, however, the recipients of drought relief are typically those who do not
implement appropriate management strategies when faced with
impending drought or those who
manage the land resource in
nonsustainable ways by overgrazing, planting inappropriate crops,
applying inappropriate tillage
practices, or storing inadequate reserves of fodder for livestock. Urban areas may seek federal or state
grants or loans when water supplies are at risk when, in fact, long-

range planning during a nondrought period could have averted
or reduced the risk.
Should society subsidize poor
land and water managers or reward
those who plan ahead or adopt appropriate management practices?
Risk management is aimed at the
latter—crisis management, the
former. The implementation of a
national drought policy in Austra-

plans largely focused on response
efforts; today the trend is for states
to place greater emphasis on mitigation as the fundamental element
of a drought plan. Enhancing
monitoring and early warning systems and conducting comprehensive risk assessments of vulnerable
population groups, economic sectors, and areas are key components
of the planning process.

If the government continues to bail out the people
most affected by drought, they will have no
incentive to protect the natural resource base.
lia in 1992 changed that nation’s
approach to drought management.
(See “Water Policy Adrift” in this issue of FORUM.) We should learn
from their experience.
Mitigating Disaster

I

n the absence of a coherent
national drought-management strategy, an increasing
number of states have
stepped in to fill the void, creating
their own drought plans during the
past two decades. 7 In 1982, only
three states had drought plans in
place. By 2000, 30 states had developed plans and six states were at
various stages of developing a plan.
The basic goal of state drought
plans should be to improve the effectiveness of preparedness and response efforts by enhancing monitoring and early warning, risk and
impact assessment, and mitigation
and response.
Plans should also contain provisions to improve coordination
within agencies of state government and between local and federal government. Initially, drought

Other mitigation strategies include public education, conflict
resolution actions among water
users, and measures that augment
supply and manage demand.
Texas, for example, is developing
a statewide drought plan that includes a requirement for local communities to develop drought plans.
Georgia’s drought plan will include a state framework with a series of more specific regional plans,
such as for the metro Atlanta area
and the Flint River basin.
Utah and Nebraska have revised
their plans to further emphasize
mitigation, and Colorado is in the
revision process. New Mexico,
which first developed a drought
plan in 1998, now has mitigation
as the primary ingredient of its
plan. Texas, Hawaii, and Georgia
are following a similar course. As
states gain more experience with
drought planning and mitigation
actions, the trend toward mitigation is expected to continue.
Initially, states were slow to develop drought plans because the
planning process was unfamiliar.
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With the development of drought
planning models and the availability of a greater number of plans
for comparison, drought planning
has become a less mysterious process. 8 As states initiate the planning process, they first study the
drought plans of other states to
compare methodology and organizational structure.
The rapid adoption of drought
plans is also a clear indication of
their benefits. Drought plans pro-

age. All of these actions can help
to improve public awareness of the
importance of water management
and the value of protecting our
limited water resources.
Leading the Way

W

ith the tremendous
advances in drought
planning at the state
level in recent years,
it should come as no surprise that
states have been extremely frus-

Unlike other natural disasters, there is no lead
federal agency for drought programs.
vide the framework for improved
coordination within and between
levels of government. Comprehensive, integrated early warning
and monitoring systems enhance
the delivery of information to decision makers at all levels. Many
states now use the Internet to disseminate information to decision
makers as well as to businesses,
farmers, the banks that provide
loans to farmers, and individual
homeowners. These websites
provide current information on
drought severity, water-use restrictions, water conservation recommendations, key contacts within state and federal agencies, and
other timely information.
Through drought plans, the
risks associated with drought can
be better defined and addressed
with active mitigation and response programs. The planning
process also allows the numerous
stakeholders to be involved early
and often in plan development.
This increases the probability that
conflicts between water users will
not escalate during times of short-
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trated with the lack of progress at
the federal level. Early into the
1995-1996 drought, the lack of
leadership and coordination at the
federal level quickly became obvious, as attempts to access drought
assistance programs were unsuccessful because federal programs
had been discontinued, were
underfunded, or in some cases had
not received appropriations from
Congress.
Unlike other natural disasters
where Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides
leadership and coordinates federal
response efforts, there is no lead
federal agency for drought programs. This failure of leadership
continued in later droughts. Recent initiatives toward developing
a national drought policy are the
direct result of those frustrations.
A national drought policy
should establish a clear set of principles to govern the management
of drought and its impacts. The
policy should be consistent and
equitable for all regions, population groups, and economic sectors
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and consistent with the goals of
sustainable development.
Drought policy should emphasize risk management through the
application of preparedness and
mitigation. In advance of drought,
planning needs to be encouraged
at all levels of government, monitoring and early warning systems
must be integrated and improved,
risk assessments should be conducted, and mitigation actions
and programs should be identified
and implemented. These actions
will increase the level of readiness
and improve operational and institutional capabilities for responding to a drought. Mitigation—
short-term and long-term actions,
programs, or policies implemented during and in advance of
drought—reduces the degree of
risk to human life, property, and
productivity.
Emergency response, however,
will always be a part of drought
management since we cannot
avoid or reduce all potential impacts through mitigation programs. In addition, it is probable
that a future drought will exceed
the drought of record and, therefore, the capacity of a region to
respond.
Emergency response should be
used sparingly, however, and only
in a way that supports long-term
goals and objectives.
A national drought policy should
also reduce risk by developing
better awareness and understanding
of the hazard and the underlying
causes of societal vulnerability. A
risk-management approach promotes improved forecasts as well as
integrated monitoring and early
warning systems, encourages preparedness plans and mitigation
programs at various levels of government, and supports a safety net

of emergency response programs
that ensure timely and targeted
relief.
Sense of Urgency

C

alls for action on drought
policy and plan development in the United States
date back to at least the
late 1970s. Today, the federal
government’s failure to adequately
address the spiraling impacts of
drought has provoked a growing
number of calls for action.
Clearly, the traditional, reactive,
crisis management approach,
which has relied on ad hoc interagency committees that are
quickly disbanded following the
end of a drought, isn’t working.
The lessons—the successes and
failures—of these responses have
quickly been forgotten, and the
failures are simply repeated with
the next event.
In response, a number of state
organizations, scientific panels,
and federal agencies—including
the Western Governors’ Policy Office, General Accounting Office,
National Academy of Sciences,
Great Lakes Commission, Interstate Council on Water Policy, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency,
American Meteorological Society,
Office of Technology Assessment,
FEMA, Western Governors’ Association, and Western Water Policy
Review Advisory Commission—
have issued calls for action. 9 The
diversity of these stakeholders illustrates the extent of drought’s
impact on the economy and environment and the growing concern
over the ineffectiveness of prior
response efforts to address the
complex, spiraling impacts of
drought in a timely and equitable
fashion.
More recently, in response to

the severe impacts of drought in
1996, FEMA was directed to chair
a multi-state task force to address
the drought situation in the Southwest and southern Great Plains
states. The purpose of the task
force was to coordinate the federal
response to problems in the
drought-stricken region by identifying needs, applicable programs, and program barriers. The
task force was also directed to sug-

Fourth, states strongly requested
that a single federal agency be appointed to coordinate drought preparedness and response.
The drought of 1996 also spurred
development of a drought task force
under the leadership of the Western Governors’ Association. Formed
in June 1996 as a result of a resolution offered by Governor Gary
Johnson of New Mexico, the task
force emphasized the importance

Clearly, the traditional, reactive, crisis
management approach isn’t working.
gest ways to improve drought management through short- and longterm national actions.
The final report contained several important long-term recommendations.
First, the task force called for the
development of a national drought
policy based on the philosophy of
cooperation with state and local
stakeholders. This policy should
include a national climate and
drought monitoring system to provide early warning of the onset and
severity of drought to federal,
state, and local officials.
Second, the task force suggested
that a regional forum be created
to assess regional needs and resources, identify critical areas and
interests, provide reliable and
timely information, and coordinate
state actions.
Third, the task force asked
FEMA to include drought as one
of the natural hazards addressed
in the National Mitigation Strategy, given the substantial costs associated with its occurrence and
the numerous opportunities available to mitigate its effects.

of a comprehensive, integrated
drought response.
The task force made several important recommendations. First, a
national drought policy is needed
to integrate actions and responsibilities among all levels of government. The policy should emphasize preparedness, response, and
mitigation measures.
Second, states should develop
contingency plans to provide early
warning of drought to stakeholders, short- and long-term mitigation and response programs, along
with triggers for the start-up and
shut-down of these programs.
Third, a regional drought coordinating council should be created
to develop sustainable policy,
monitor drought conditions, assess state-level responses, identify
impacts and issues for resolution,
and work in partnership with the
federal government to address
drought-related needs.
Fourth, a federal interagency
coordinating group should be established with a designated lead
agency for drought coordination
with states and regional agencies.
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The FEMA and Western Governors’ Association reports have
spurred a number of important
policy initiatives. In early 1997,
FEMA, Western Governors’ Association, the Small Business Administration, and the U.S. departments of Agriculture, Interior, and
Commerce signed a memorandum
of understanding calling for a part-

tional climate-monitoring system
in support of that policy, as well
as to develop state drought mitigation plans. Although impacts
of drought occur mainly at the local, state, and regional level, this
study concluded that it was imperative for the federal government
to provide the leadership necessary
to improve the way the nation

A national drought policy is needed to integrate
actions and responsibilities among all levels of
government.
nership among federal, state, local, and tribal governments to reduce drought impacts in the western United States. This MOU
resulted in the following actions:
■ The formation of the Western
Drought Coordination Council to
address the recommendations of
the western governors;
■ The designation of the USDA as
the lead federal agency for drought,
to carry out the objectives of the
MOU; and
■ The establishment by USDA of
a federal interagency drought coordinating group.
Concurrently, the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission, created by the Western
Water Policy Act of 1992, reexamined western water policy. 10 One
of the reports published by the
commission summarized recommendations from recent studies on
drought management that should
be incorporated in future attempts
to integrate drought management
and water policy in the West. 11
The consensus of these studies
emphasized the need to create a
national drought policy and a na-
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prepares for and responds to
drought.
The severe drought of 1996 and
the initiatives it inspired also led
Senator Pete Domenici and Congressman Joe Skeen of New Mexico
to introduce the National Drought
Policy Act of 1998 in Congress. This
bill created the National Drought
Policy Commission to “provide
advice and recommendations on
creation of an integrated, coordinated Federal policy designed to
prepare for and respond to serious
drought emergencies.”
In a report submitted to Congress and the president in May
2000, the National Drought
Policy Commission recommended
that the United States establish a
national drought policy emphasizing preparedness. The goals of this
policy would be to:
■ Incorporate planning, implementation of plans and mitigation
measures, risk management, resource stewardship, environmental considerations, and public education as key elements of an
effective national drought policy;
■ Improve collaboration among sci-
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entists and managers to enhance
observation networks, monitoring,
prediction, information delivery,
and applied research, as well as
foster public understanding of and
preparedness for drought;
■ Develop and incorporate comprehensive insurance and financial
strategies into drought preparedness plans;
■ Maintain a safety net of emergency relief that emphasizes sound
stewardship of natural resources
and self-help; and
■ Coordinate drought programs
and resources effectively and efficiently and in a customer-oriented
manner.
The National Drought Policy
Commission further recommended
creation of a long-term National
Drought Council composed of federal and nonfederal members to
implement the recommendations of
the commission. The commission
further recommended that Congress
designate the secretary of Agriculture as co-chair of the Council, with
a nonfederal co-chair to be elected
by the nonfederal council members.
In late 2000, Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman established an
interim National Drought Council,
pending action on a permanent
council by the U.S. Congress.
The true legacy of the 19951996 drought is not likely to be
its economic, environmental, and
social impacts, but rather the
policy initiatives that occurred in
the post-drought period. These
initiatives appear to be changing
the way droughts are viewed, and
they may change the way droughts
are managed in the United States.
The real question is whether these
changes will result in permanent
and substantive modifications in
the way government entities deal
with drought.

Cloudy Future

D

rought is a normal part
of climate for essentially all regions of the
United States. Likewise, drought relief has become a
common feature of the national
landscape. Shaped over the course
of the past century and a half, this
relief occurs primarily under a diverse, complex, confusing, and
poorly coordinated ensemble of
federal programs. It is reactive and
does little to lessen the risks associated with future droughts. It is
becoming increasingly clear that
current land and water-supply
management practices are not sustainable in the long term, especially given the variability of climate and the increasing demand
on natural resources.
Although state and federal attention to improving drought
management in the United States
has been copious in recent years,
including the National Drought
Policy Act of 1998, little change
in practice is visible to date, especially at the federal level. Federal
response to drought conditions in
1999 and 2000 was reactive and
short-term in scope—in other
words, business as usual. To fill the
vacuum, states have continued to
be the most progressive actors in
drought management, a trend
that began in the early to mid1980s. Regardless of progress by
states, improved drought management requires an integrated approach between and within levels
of government.
True, federal agencies are now
speaking the new language of
drought management, and phrases
like “improved coordination and
cooperation,” “increased emphasis
on mitigation and preparedness,”
and “building nonfederal/federal

partnerships” have become commonplace. Nevertheless, the mentality of most state and federal
government agencies remains response oriented.
Existing institutional inertia of
federal emergency response programs and the expectations of the
recipients of assistance programs,
however, encourage drought management to remain in a reactive,
crisis-management mode. It is not
yet apparent whether federal and
state policymakers clearly understand the scope of the changes that
will be required to invoke the new
paradigm of risk management.
When drought occurs, especially
in election years, drought relief is
one method that members of Congress use to send money home to
their constituents.
The true test of whether we are
making progress will be if Congress
and the administration enthusiastically embrace the recommendations of the National Drought
Policy Commission and other
groups, provide adequate funding
to support commission goals and
recommendations, and direct federal agencies to modify existing
policies and programs to emphasize mitigation and preparedness.
If they do, they will shift funding
from crisis to risk management and
implement the new paradigm.
Only time will determine the
dedication of the nation to this
new approach to drought management. A continuation of widespread, severe drought in the next
few years would certainly engender greater support for this new
paradigm and help us continue
down the path to risk management. The political will to change
the way we manage drought appears to be genuine but may
evaporate quickly if we experience

a series of wet years. Changing the
momentum of the past will be difficult, but it is critical for the scientific community and the public
to hold policymakers to this commitment. ■
Donald A. Wilhite is director of
the National Drought Mitigation
Center and the International
Drought Information Center and a
professor in the School of Natural
Resource Sciences at the University
of Nebraska, in Lincoln.
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